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AFTER PARTITION: THE PERILS OF SOUTH 
SUDAN 
 
Dr. Mario Silva 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The partition of South Sudan from the largest country on the 
African continent – Sudan, took place on July 9, 2011.1  The northern 
portion retained the name Sudan while the newly formed southern state 
would be known as South Sudan.  South Sudan became the newest 
member of the United Nations (UN) with comparatively little 
infrastructure and limited arrangements for shared sovereignty by the 
international community.2  The partition process was undertaken with 
oversight from the United Nations and the African Union.3  It was 
rather idealistically considered a prelude to an enduring peace within 
this traditionally troubled African region.  The former unitary state of 
Sudan had been plagued by bitter internecine conflict for more than 
half a century, and as a result, an estimated 2.5 million people lost their 
lives and over five million were internally displaced.4 
Prior to partition, a referendum in the southern region of the then 
unitary Sudanese state took place in January 2011.5  Support for 
secession from the Sudanese state was over 98%.6  The actual partition 
process had moved forward with relatively little violence, and every 
 
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE ON SOUTH 
SUDAN, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/southsudan/178466.htm. 
 2. U.N. Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml#s (providing that 
South Sudan was admitted as a New Member State on July 14, 2011). 
 3. Press Release, Security Council, United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on 
Peace and Security, U.N. Press Release AFR/ 2254 (Sept. 26, 2011) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/afr2254.doc.htm. 
 4. Kingsley Ighobor, Uprooting the Causes of Conflict, AFRICA RENEWAL MAG. (Aug. 
2013) http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/uprooting-causes-
conflicts.  
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1. 
 6. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in 
Sudan Until 9 July 2011, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1978 (2011), U.N. Press 
Release SC/ 10233 (April 27, 2011) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10233.doc.htm. 
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reasonable hope existed to expect a peaceful coexistence between 
Sudan and the new state of South Sudan.  However, disputes as well 
as interethnic differences have once again resulted in fighting, and 
fears of a protracted internal and external conflict in South Sudan have 
re-emerged.  Accompanying this resurgent conflict is the fear that 
another humanitarian crisis could occur in the region as food shortages 
in the South now threaten millions of people once again. 
Fault for the fact that partition has failed to bring peace to the 
region is increasingly being assigned to undue haste and lack of 
international supervision.  South Sudan, it would seem in retrospect, 
was permitted to secede without the establishment of mechanisms to 
resolve internal and external disputes.  Moreover, during the transition 
to independence, all power was assigned to an interim government 
instead of a coalition of interests, which occurred without a United 
Nations trusteeship arrangement.7 
The transfer of control by failed states to the United Nations 
requires considerable debate and a clear consensus among UN member 
states, so as to prevent equating transferral of control with any form of 
colonial takeover.8 The authority of the International Trusteeship 
System and the terms for administration and designation of authority 
is outlined under Chapter XII of the UN Charter.9  The notion of 
sovereign equality was unquestionably important to the architecture of 
the Charter following the devastation of the Second World War;10 
however, at the time of signing there were only fifty-one member 
states, and by 2011 South Sudan became the 193rd member state.11 
As the crisis in South Sudan worsens, with mounting evidence of 
gross violations of international human rights law and internal strife, it 
is important to critically analyze the reasons for the failure of the 
partition to bring about peace, and to review solutions the international 
community might implement to realize peaceful co-existence between 
the two “Sudans.” 
 
 7. United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, supra note 3. 
 8. U.N. Charter art. 77-85. 
 9. Id. 
 10. U.N. Charter art. 77. 
 11. U.N. Member States, supra note 2. 
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The United Nations peacekeeping Mission in the Republic of 
South Sudan (UNMISS) was authorized by the Security Council in 
December 2013 to double its armed strength to nearly 14,000 in an 
effort to protect civilians.12  However, its mandate is not adequate to 
deal with the challenges. 
The power struggle between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and 
the former Vice President Riek Machar has made the challenge of state 
reconstruction an impossible task.  The current efforts by the East 
African regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), to find a peaceful solution will not lead to long 
term stability as there is no political will by IGAD, nor the international 
community for long-term state-building efforts. 
If there is hope that a failed state such as South Sudan can be 
rescued from this situation, efforts to do so will require more 
international assistance and the pursuit for comprehensive approaches, 
which entails putting the country under a UN mandate, pending such 





South Sudan’s history is characterized by tribal migrations from 
the Nile region and also from within Central Africa.13  The people of 
South Sudan have resisted outsiders, including the French and 
Belgians, as well as the spread of Islam to the south.14  By 1821 the 
name Sudan, borrowed from an Arab term meaning “Land of the 
Blacks,” led to the beginning of an emergent political entity.15  The 
British eventually expanded their influence to the south in the late 
 
 12. Press Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2132 (2013), 
Security Council Increases United Nations Mission’s Military Presence in South 
Sudan, U.N. Press Release SC/ 11230 (Dec. 24, 2013) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11230.doc.htm. 
 13. See P. M. HOLT & M. W. DALY, A HISTORY OF THE SUDAN: FROM THE COMING OF 
ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 1, 3 (Pearson Educ. Ltd., 5th ed. 2000) (The Arabic term 
used was “Bilad al Sudan,” “Land of the Blacks”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Holt & Daly, supra note 13 at 3.  
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nineteenth century, and included Sudan.16  For all practical purposes, 
Britain ruled Sudan until 1956, even though officially, by virtue of an 
1899 agreement, the country was to be jointly administered by Egypt 
and Britain.17  In reality, London chose which officials would 
administer Sudan, and Egypt remained very much a junior partner.18 
In 1947, British hopes to join South Sudan with Uganda were 
dashed by the Juba Conference, which aimed to unify North and South 
Sudan.19  The realities of Britain’s post-war status meant that it was not 
well positioned to resist political change, and consequently in 1953, 
elections were conducted and Ismail al-Azhari became the country’s 
first prime minister.20  The British and the Egyptians departed Sudan 
on January 1, 1956, which was the day that Sudan became formally 
independent.21  However, prior to the official proclamation of 
independence, rebellion had broken out in the southern part of Sudan.22  
In actuality, the concept of a united Sudan was a colonial creation, and 
with Britain’s departure it was almost inevitable that conflict would 
follow.  This familiar fault line, characterized by the Arab north versus 
the African south, held deep and enduring animosity. 
The divergent nature of the southern and northern regions is 
illuminated in the partitioned state, where South Sudan has a 
population of over 8 million and a predominantly rural, subsistence 
economy.23  Today, South Sudan struggles to cope with the effects of 
conflict, displacement, and insecurity.  The country has many tribal 
groups and languages, and its people practice traditional, indigenous 
beliefs, irrespective of the fact that over 90% of the population identify 






 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 102, 104. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 102, 104. 
 22. Id. 
 23. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1. 
 24. Id. 
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II. CIVIL WAR 
 
The conflict between the North and South has endured principally 
as a result of a long-held tendency by successive governments in 
Khartoum to view the difficulties with the South as issues best resolved 
militarily.  Initial promises by northern political leaders to establish a 
federal state structure and uphold secularism were not honored. The 
provisional constitution adopted at the time of independence was silent 
on fundamental issues for southern leaders, such as “the secular or 
Islamic character of the state and its federal or unitary structure.”25  The 
agreement, implied or statutory, with respect to how the newly 
independent Sudan would function was quickly disregarded by the 
Arab-led Khartoum government, which resulted in a long civil conflict 
lasting from 1955 until 1972. 
In the early years of Sudanese independence, a military coup lead 
by General Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the elected government and 
suspended democracy.  General Abboud pursued a policy of 
“Arabization and Islamisation throughout the Sudan that strengthened 
southern opposition.”26  In 1964, General Abboud was overthrown and 
replaced with a civilian caretaker government.  At the time southern 
leaders were divided into two factions: those who wanted a federal 
solution and those who advocated independence.27 
An opportunity for reconciliation occurred when the southern 
rebels signed an agreement in Addis Ababa in 1972, establishing a 
measure of autonomy for the South.28  However, this development did 
not endure for long, and its demise was hastened when international 
oil companies discovered substantial oil reserves in the South in the 
late 1970s.29  In 1983, President Nimeiri abrogated the peace treaty by 
revising Sudan’s civil laws to establish conformity with Sharia, or 
Islamic Law, and in so doing ignited the second Sudan civil war.30 
When the second civil war commenced, the government in 
Khartoum clearly had every intention of exploiting the South’s natural 
 
 25. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
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resources.31  A military coup led by General Omar al Bashir took place, 
and upon his assumption of power, he banned all political parties. The 
authoritarian regime supported radical Islamist groups, including 
providing a training base to terrorist organizations such as Osama Bin 
Laden’s al Qaida.32 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) managed to survive 
the chaos of the 1990s and remained the principal party participating 
in negotiations between the North and the South.  In 1997, the 
Khartoum government had agreed to permit a referendum in the South 
to determine whether the people there desired independence, or a 
continued unified state with the North.  Irrespective of this, it took 
another eight years to end the fighting when the SPLA and the al Bashir 
government signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 
January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya.33 
This milestone agreement established a ceasefire, regional and 
national elections, resettlement of internally displaced persons, 
withdrawal of troops from South Sudan, and a free referendum to 
determine the status of South Sudan.34  Under the power sharing 
agreement, Colonel John Garang was named Vice President and Omar 
al Bashir retained the presidency.  Seven months later, Colonel Garang 
died in a helicopter crash.  The man who would eventually become 
South Sudan’s first President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, took over after Col. 




 31. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1. 
 32. Id.; see also Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, State Dep’t, Country 
Reports on Terrorism (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf (Released on Aug. 18, 2011, 
the U.S. Department of State’s annual terrorism assessment concluded that terrorist 
groups, including “Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists, remain in Sudan as gaps remained in 
the Sudanese government’s knowledge of and ability to identify and capture these 
individuals as well as prevent them from exploiting the territory for smuggling 
activities.”). 
 33. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, The Government of the Republic of Sudan – 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, July 20, 
2002, available at 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_060000_The%20Compreh
ensive%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
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A. Referendum and State Formation 
 
Consistent with the terms of the 2005 peace accord, a referendum 
was conducted from January 9-15, 2011, to determine if South Sudan 
should declare its independence from Sudan.35  The official results 
were released on January 30, 2011, indicating that 98.83% of the 
population supported independence.36  This led to the formal 
declaration of independence by the Republic of South Sudan on July 
9, 2011.37  The newly independent state was quickly recognized as the 
newest member of the United Nations.38  The Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1996 and established a Mission in the Republic of South 
Sudan (UNMISS) to consolidate peace and to assist in nurturing 
condition for development.39 Resolution 1996 emphasized the 
importance of partnerships and consultation, as well as encouraging 
the new South Sudanese government to ratify international human 
rights treaties.40 
The transitional constitution, ratified by the South Sudan 
assembly just prior to independence, provided a legal framework for 
the new nation state.41  The constitution establishes a mixed 
presidential system of government, headed by a president who is head 
of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces.42 It also establishes the National Legislature comprising of two 
houses: a directly elected assembly, the National Legislative 
Assembly; and a second chamber of representatives of the states, the 
 
 35. Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Sudan Until 9 July 2011, 
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1978 (2011), supra note 6. 
 36. Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Sudan Until 9 July 2011, 
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1978 (2011), supra note 6. 
 37. Press Release, Security Council,  ‘Like Any Newborn, South Sudan Needs Help,’ 
Secretary-General Says, Moments After Security Council Recommends Country’s 
Admission to United Nations, U.N. Press Release SC/10323 (July 13, 2011). 
 38. U.N. Member States, supra note 2. 
 39. ‘Like Any Newborn,’ supra note 37. 
 40. S.C. Res. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1996 (July 8, 2011) 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(2011). 
 41. THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, July 9, 2011, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=250715. 
 42. Id. 
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Council of States.43 The constitution also provides for an independent 
judiciary, the highest level being the Supreme Court.44 
The referendum unfortunately left several contentious issues 
unresolved.  One issue was the future of the Abyei region where a 
simultaneous referendum was supposed to be held; however, it was 
postponed due to disputes over demarcation lines and residency rights.  
The ensuing clashes in Abyei eventually led the Sudanese President, 
Omar al-Bashir, and the President of the autonomous Government of 
Southern Sudan, to agree in 2008 to have the boundary issue arbitrated 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.45  In 2009 the Abyei’s 
boundaries were redefined when the Tribunal of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration ruled that: 
The eastern boundary of the Abyei Area runs along 
longitude 29°00’00”E, from latitude 10°10’00”N south to the 
Kordofan – Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 
January 1956.  Moreover, the Tribunal rules that the western 
boundary of the Abyei Area runs along longitude 
27°50’00”E, from latitude 10°10’00”N south to the Kordofan 
– Darfur boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956.  The 
western boundary of Abyei Area then follows the Darfur-
Kordofan boundary until it meets the southern boundary of 
the Abyei Area.46 
The Tribunal decision was based on scholarly, documentary, 
cartographic, and oral evidence submitted by the parties.47  The parties 
have yet to respect the decision and tensions remain high.  The final 
status of the Abyei region remains unresolved even after the October 
2013 non-binding referendum, which overwhelmingly supported 
 
 43. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Gov’t of Sudan v. Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (“Abyei Arbitration”) 
(Arb. Trib. July 22, 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1240. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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joining South Sudan.48  The referendum was proposed by the African 
Union.49  The other conflict area is South Kordofan, where fighting had 
broken out in June 2011 between Sudan and the SPLA over the 
ownership of the Nuba Mountains.  Once again, in July 2012, fighting 
continued in the region including involvement from Darfur region 
insurgents. 
Although Sudan was the first country to recognize South Sudan’s 
independence, relations have certainly not developed along friendly 
lines. The biggest remaining problem is the sharing of oil revenues.  
An estimated 80% of oil production of undivided Sudan came from the 
south and Sudan now wants an increased share of that revenue.  Once 
again, this was supposed to have been settled by the August 2, 2012 
deadline; however, the nature of the negotiations and the tenor of 
exchanges between the two governments makes achieving an 
agreement by the set date unlikely. 
 
III. PARTITIONING CONFLICT OIL 
 
The dispute over oil revenues stems from the fact that the 
Sudanese government derived as much as 98% of its budgetary 
revenues from the sale of almost half a million barrels of oil per day.50  
The creation of South Sudan deprived Khartoum of most of its oil.  The 
crux of the current problem is that South Sudan’s oil is exported 
through two pipelines controlled by Sudan.51  These oil pipelines run 
to refineries and export terminals at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.52  A 
 
 48. Musaazi Namiti, Analysis: Struggle for power in South Sudan, AL JAZEERA, Dec. 21, 
2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/analysis-struggle-power-
south-sudan-20131217845861691.html (explaining that he Dinka people with close 
ties to South Sudan participated in the vote but not the Arab Misseriya). 
 49. Id. 





 51. South Sudan: Economy, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/countrytemplate_od.html.  
 52. Id.  
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2005 oil-sharing agreement with Khartoum called for an even share of 
oil revenues between the two entities, but that arrangement concluded 
when South Sudan became an independent state.53  As South Sudan 
resisted paying huge fees to Khartoum for oil transportation, it suffered 
blockades imposed on its goods and capital.54 
According to Luka Biong Deng, a former minister of the national 
government of Sudan and a senior member of the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement, the two states depend so heavily upon oil 
revenues that differences over revenue sharing after secession have 
triggered intensely antagonistic feelings.55  Deng noted: 
It would have been simple arrangements after secession 
that the South to manage its own oil and pay internationally 
accepted fees for the use of oil infrastructure in the Sudan.  
However, after the secession of the South, Sudan puts very a 
high bill to be covered by the South not only for the use of its 
pipelines (USD36 per barrel) but also to meet the budget 
deficit (USD10 billion) caused by the secession of the 
South.56 
In January 2012, South Sudan shut down all oil production due to 
the dispute over the high fees demanded by Khartoum for transporting 
its oil.57  The decision surprised the world community and exposed 
Khartoum and Juba’s political and economic fragility.  The decision 
has led to fighting along the border, as access to the oil is viewed as a 
matter of survival for Sudan.58  According to a former U.S. envoy to 
 
 53. South Sudan: Economy, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/countrytemplate_od.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Luka Boing Deng, Sudan and South Sudan: Where are they heading?, SUDAN TRIB., 
May 11, 2012, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=42561. 
 56. Id. 
 57. South Sudan: Economy, supra note 51. 
 58. United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, UNMIS PUBLIC 
INFORMATION OFFICE (June 2011), 
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2011Docs/inSUDAN-June-2011-eng-
web.pdf. 
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Sudan, the country demanded $36 a barrel to transport the oil to Port 
Sudan, while the going international rate is less than $1.59 
In May, Sudan seized control of the Abyei region, a disputed oil-
rich territory.60  Heavy shelling, aerial bombardment, and numerous 
tank assaults accompanied the northern advance.61  South Sudan 
declared this to be an act of war, and the United Nations was compelled 
to send an envoy to Khartoum to intervene.62  Abyei at one time 
produced more than one-fourth of Sudan’s oil, and Sudan’s Greater 
Nile Oil Pipeline runs through this region, which is claimed by both 
the states.63  Even though Abyei’s oil supplies are currently running 
low, some experts believe that untapped oil reserves still remain buried 
in the region. 
Since its discovery, revenues from oil have represented more than 
90% of foreign exchange earnings for the government,64 and after 
succession the issue has emerged as a matter of political and economic 
survival for the government of Khartoum. 
 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
Relations between the two states sharply deteriorated in 2012.  
Fighting began in March 2012 when South Sudanese forces seized the 
Heglig oil fields in lands claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan in 
the province of South Kordofan.65  The Sudanese Air Force bombed 
the South Sudan Unity oilfields, and the Sudanese Army later attacked 
the disputed areas of Jau, Pan Akuach, and Teshwin.  The South 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army reportedly repulsed most of these 
attacks. 
 
 59. Andrew S. Natsios, To Stop the War on South Sudan, the U.S. Should Send Weapons, 
WASH. POST, May 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/to-stop-the-
war-on-south-sudan-the-us-should-send-
weapons/2012/05/11/gIQAywIkIU_story.html. 
 60. United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58. 
 61. United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58. 
 62. United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58. 
 63. United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58. 
 64. Deng, supra note 55. 
 65. UN Says South Sudan Seized Oil Field Illegally, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17780226. 
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This military conflict has led to the intensification of nationalistic 
feelings in both Sudanese states.  In April, the Sudanese parliament 
passed a unanimous resolution declaring the government of Southern 
Sudan to be an “enemy.”66  This move came days after Southern 
Sudanese troops took control of Sudan’s oil-rich area of Heglig on the 
border.67  The South Sudanese forces had temporarily seized the 
North’s main Heglig oilfield for ten days in April, but were reported to 
have pushed back by military means.  The current round of fighting is 
the most serious to have taken place since the South’s independence 
last July, and it has raised fears of a more widespread war.  The 
international community is working diligently to push Sudan and 
South Sudan back to the negotiating table after talks were suspended 
in spring 2012.68 
The UN Security Council was forced to intervene in early May 
2012, and demanded that Sudan withdraw its forces from Abyei.69  
Khartoum responded by indicating that it would only do so after a joint 
military observer group was created for the area.70  The latest round of 
clashes broke out on May 9, 2012, with South Sudan accusing Sudan 
of bombing southern border states in the Upper Nile, Unity, and 
Western Bahr el-Ghazal regions.  The United Nations Security Council 
passed a resolution on May 2, 2012, threatening sanctions if the two 
sides did not follow an African Union roadmap stipulating a cease-fire 
and a return to talks within two weeks.71 
Several news reports in the early summer of 2012 suggested a 
hardening of attitudes in Khartoum.72  The Albawaba News Service 
reported that the Sudanese president Omar al Bashir declared there 
 
 66. South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, ALBAWABA NEWS (Apr. 16, 
2012), http://www.albawaba.com/main-headlines/south-sudan-declared-enemy-sudan-
parliament-421176. 
 67. UN Says South Sudan Seized Oil Field Illegally, supra note 65. 
 68. S.C. Res. 2046, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (May 2, 2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, ALBAWABA NEWS, Apr. 24, 2012, 
http://www.albawaba.com/news/sudan-rejects-calls-negotiations-south-422153. 
 71. Kremena Krumova, Sudan Intensifies Crackdown on Media: South Sudan Follows 
Suit, THE EPOCH TIMES, May 18, 2012, 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/sudan-intensifies-crackdown-on-media-
239115.html. 
 72. See generally Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, supra note 70. 
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would be no negotiations with South Sudan, “With them, we are 
negotiating with guns and bullets.”73 
Both governments spent the spring of 2012 accusing each other of 
supporting rebels in their respective territories.74  Khartoum has 
asserted that the Government of South Sudan supports rebels of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N), operating in 
Khordofan and South Blue Nile.75  Sudanese forces are alleged to have 
reacted with a brutal crackdown on rebels and their sympathizers.76 
The governor of South Khordofan in Sudan, Ahmed Harun, 
recently gave instructions to the Sudanese armed forces “clearly 
suggesting that they should not take prisoners.”77  Harun is one of three 
Sudanese men, including President Omar al-Bashir, who are the 
subject of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.78  Despite 
international pressure on the government of Sudan to surrender him to 
the ICC, Harun served as Sudan’s Minister of State for Humanitarian 
Affairs until May 2009, when he was appointed to the governorship of 
South Kordofan.79  The Sudanese government has refused to surrender 
Harun to the ICC, arguing that the court has no jurisdiction over the 
case and that the possible crimes were a matter for the Sudanese 
judicial system. 
Another major issue of concern is the expulsion of South 
Sudanese from Sudan, following partition.80  Khartoum has threatened 
and issued an ultimatum to an estimated 500,000 ethnic South 
Sudanese to leave or join Sudan by filing the required residency 
 
 73. Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, supra note 70. 
 74. Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, supra note 70. 
 75. South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66. 
 76. Krumova, supra note 71. 
 77. South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66. 
 78. South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66. 
 79. South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66. 
 80. South Sudan ‘Bombing’ Despite UN Sanctions Deadline, BBC NEWS, May 4, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17954805. 
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paperwork.81  Official estimates note that 350,000 South Sudanese 
remain in several refugee camps in Sudan.82 
The fighting and economic challenges have led to acute food 
scarcity in South Sudan.83 The United Nations has called for 
emergency assistance for the millions of Southern Sudanese who are 
facing unparalleled levels of food insecurity.84  The World Food 
Program estimates that about “4.7 million people in South Sudan are 
in need of food assistance, with an estimated 1 million people set to 
suffer from food insecurity in 2012, and another 3.7 million people 
likely to face significant vulnerabilities to food insecurity.”85  Of the 
estimated 9 million people, half are currently under the age of eighteen 
and yet, the country suffers from high unemployment, infant mortality, 
and substantial rates of literacy.86  According to UNICEF, “70 percent 
of children between six and seventeen years of age have never been to 
school.”87 
 
V. INSTABILITY AND INTERNAL CONFLICT 
 
No less critical than its external conflict with Sudan is South 
Sudan’s myriad of domestic challenges.  The basic problem stems 
from the disparate tribal societies that constitute South Sudan’s 
population.  It is estimated that the country is comprised of more than 
sixty distinct cultural and linguistic groups, each of which have strong 
tribal loyalties.88 Rebels opposed to the SPLA-dominated South Sudan 
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government accuse the administration of plotting to retain power 
indefinitely and maintain that the regime is not fairly representing all 
tribal groups.89 
These tribal groups were united in their opposition to the North 
and their struggle for self-determination.90  However, in the post-
secessionist state, this key element has been removed with no other 
unifying issue to fill the gap.  The latest member of the UN has found 
itself with an unclear sense of nationhood, “making its viability as a 
nation a matter of speculation.”91 
Inter-ethnic clashes have been endemic to South Sudan for many 
years now.  Jonglei is the largest of the ten states in South Sudan.92  In 
2009, conflict erupted, killing more than 2,000 people and displacing 
approximately 250,000 others.93  In December 2011, tribal clashes in 
Jonglei intensified between the Nuer White Army of the Lou Nuer and 
the Murle.  The White Army warned that it would wipe out the Murle 
and fight the South Sudanese and UN forces sent to the area around 
Pibor. 
Six months after succession, there were deadly clashes between 
the Lou Nuer and Murle communities, which led to the displacement 
of thousands of civilians.94  Hilde Johnson, the Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative and head of the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS), expressed deep concern about the killings at press 
conference on January 19, 2012.95  Hate messages were delivered by 
some individuals and groups, which she said could incite systematic 
ethnic violence.96 
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Presently, as many as nine of South Sudan’s ten provinces are 
reported to be embroiled in violence caused by local militias and armed 
ethnic groups.  In many places, euphoria about independence has been 
replaced by despondence.  While the war with Khartoum is worrying 
the people of the new nation, it is the internal conflicts that are a 
seemingly more pressing threat.  Thus, greater increased attention to 
the issue is needed.  Contrary to those in the West, who would argue 
in support of further arms for South Sudan to curtail acts of aggression 
by Khartoum, a recent statement published by Amnesty International 
accuses the U.S., Russia and China of fuelling violations in the Sudan 
conflict through the arms trade.97 
In late December 2013, the Security Council held a series of crisis 
meetings on South Sudan, and demanded immediate cessation of 
hostilities following a report by UNMISS.  The report provided 
“mounting evidence of gross human rights abSes in the strife-torn 
country, including, extra-judicial killings of civilians and captured 
soldiers, massive displacements and arbitrary detentions, often on 
ethnic grounds.”98 
The situation was a result of a coup d’état on December 14, 2013 
by the former Vice President Riek Machar, who was dismissed in July 
2013.  President Kiir belongs to the Dinka ethnic group and Machar to 
the Lou Nuer.  There is mounting evidence of ethnic targeting of South 
Sudanese citizens. 
 
VI. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND STATE BUILDING 
 
The euphoria generated by the independence of South Sudan has 
quickly dissipated, raising serious doubts as to the future viability of 
the new nation, and many speculate on the wisdom of the potentially 
unrealistic and rushed acceptance by the United Nation of its latest 
member.  As far back as 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace 
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Agreement (CPA) was signed, the international community 
optimistically, or naively, assumed that this would lead to peace and 
stability in the region.99  Some supporters of South Sudan assume that 
the situation can be repaired if only Sudan could be restrained 
militarily.  Andrew S. Natsios, George W. Bush’s former envoy to 
Sudan and a professor at Georgetown University, suggests that the 
solution lies in arming South Sudan: 
Its war with the North is the result of an imbalance of 
military power that has encouraged military adventurism. 
Omar al-Bashir, President of the North and a possible coup 
target, believes he can secure his future by bombing the South 
into submission instead of negotiating. . . The only way to 
end the North’s bullying and foster peace talks is to give the 
South the right tools: American anti-aircraft weapons.  If the 
United States provides the materiel [sic], the South can end 
the North’s bombing campaign.100 
However, as noted above, both Khartoum and Juba are already 
receiving arms from various states.  Unfortunately, acts of aggression 
by Sudan are not the only problem with which South Sudan must 
contend.  The inability of South Sudan’s President, Salva Kiir, to 
address the grievances of the smaller tribes and ethnic groups is a 
significant problem that war with the North cannot gloss over.  In his 
Independence Day speech, President Kiir had promised “transparency 
and open government” as the main priorities for the new nation.  
However, the opposition in South Sudan claims that the President has 
not kept his word and is not open to transparency in government. 
State building essentially assumes that a modern state has a certain 
set of obligations that must be met, such as respect for the rule of law, 
accountability, security, and welfare.  State building can also involve 
the construction of basic infrastructure, such as roads for ease of 
transportation.  This is an important endeavour, given that, as has 
been demonstrated by several scholars with respect to Africa, the 
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“government’s inability to broadcast power into peripheral regions 
of state territory lies at the heart of state failure and collapse.”101 
 Reconstruction and state building are daunting tasks even in 
the most opportune circumstances.  Furthermore, it may not always 
be possible to have an overarching authority that can guarantee 
security, and therefore it has been suggested that a new 
mechanism, created and supported by the international 
community, needs to take root.  State formation in South Sudan 
has not effectively occurred. 
 
VII. ROLE OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
The UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions 
dealing with the conflict in Sudan, including the unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004, regarding the humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur.102  However, more pertinent to the issue of South Sudan, was 
the adoption on November 19, 2004, of Security Council Resolution 
1574, which provided support for the implementation of a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.103  The resolution 
was adopted at a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, and was only the fourth 
meeting held outside its New York City headquarters since 1952.  
Since the milestone Resolution 1574, and the involvement in several 
peace initiatives in Sudan, UN participation in the creation of the 
Republic of South Sudan has been critical.104 
The legal framework was established with the Referendum Act, 
and the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) was formed 
at the national level.  The Security Council has also unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, which contains the first official reference to the 
Responsibility to Protect.  This resolution was cited when Resolution 
1996 was adopted on the eve of the birth of the Republic of South 
Sudan, when the Security Council welcomed the new state and 
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reaffirmed its strong commitment to the “sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity, and national unity of the Republic of South 
Sudan.”105  It also noted that, “national ownership and national 
responsibility are key to establishing sustainable peace and the primary 
responsibility of national authorities in identifying their priorities and 
strategies for post-conflict peace building.”106 
Yet the same motion also deplored the security situation in the 
region and emphasized the need for clarity regarding the “roles, 
responsibilities, and collaboration between UNMISS and the UN 
Country Team.” The Security Council further determined under 
Chapter VII that the situation in South Sudan “continues to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security in the region.” A UN 
mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was supposed to 
operate for one year; however, on July 5, 2012, Resolution 2057 was 
passed which extended the mission for another twelve months.107 
UNMISS’ mission from the beginning has always been to 
establish the conditions to strengthen the capacity of the Government 
of South Sudan, as well as assist and advise on the fulfilment of its 
responsibility to comply with international humanitarian and human 
rights law. 
In April 2013, five Indian UNMISS troops and several civilians 
were killed in a rebel ambush in Jonglei.  UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon called the killings a war crime.108  The crisis intensified with 
further mass violation of human rights, ethnic targeting, and an 
attempted military coup, which, on December 24, 2013, resulted in 
Security Council authorization to double the number of existing troops.  
Since its inception, South Sudan has demonstrated that inadequate 
resolutions by the Security Council will not lead to reconstruction and 
stability of the latest member of the UN, and confirm the need for a 
more robust trusteeship arrangement. 
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VIII. LIMITED TRUSTEESHIP 
 
The question of South Sudan transferring control to a United 
Nations Trusteeship Council requires considerable debate.  The issue 
of state sovereignty and self-determination remain, as in the times of 
the mandate system, legal challenges to prospective trusteeships.  
Trusteeship today, is both complicated and highly political. Under the 
United Nations Trusteeship System, no member can be put under 
trusteeship due to the international legal principle of state sovereignty.  
However, both the Security Council and the International Court of 
Justice have shown flexibility in their interpretation of the Charter.  
The Security Council could authorize some form of shared sovereignty 
to assist a failing state. 
The United Nations Charter must set out specific conventions if it 
is ever to move forward toward some form of shared sovereignty in the 
wake of state failure.  A partnership needs to be encouraged between 
the United Nations and the Member State, and trust needs to be 
developed at the local level to avoid any resentment among the local 
population.  Articles 75-91 of Chapter XII of the United Nations 
Charter outline the authority of International Trusteeship System.109  
Under Article 75, for example, “The United Nations shall establish 
under its authority an international trusteeship system for the 
administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed 
there under by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are 
hereinafter referred to as trust territories.”110 
On the question of failed states becoming part of a trusteeship, the 
Secretary-General replied that this is something the United Nations 
Member States will have to discuss.111 The United Nations Charter 
precludes the kind of trusteeship indicated above, as the International 
Trusteeship System applies only to former League mandates, 
territories captured during the Second World War, and other areas 
placed under trusteeship by their administering states.  However, as 
stated in Article 78, “[t]he trusteeship system shall not apply to 
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territories which have become Members of the United Nations”.112  
This limitation reflects the colonial situation and the priorities of 
Member States of the United Nations at the close of the Second World 
War. 
The creation of a trusteeship in 1945 over a Member State would 
have been viewed as inconsistent with the premise that the United 
Nations was to be based upon “the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all Members,”113 and that it would not interfere with their internal 
affairs.  However, states could voluntarily relinquish control over their 
internal and external affairs for a defined period of time.  The 
trusteeship plan could, however, go further with the United Nations, or 
a group of states serving as the administering authority for South 
Sudan. 
Obtaining political consensus is a difficult undertaking at the 
United Nations, and changing the Charter would be even more 
challenging, as many states would assert that such an action would 
undermine Article II, Section 1, or the “sovereign equality” provision.  
However, as noted by scholars, most failed states hardly govern 
themselves; thus the notion of sovereignty is changing.  This would 
necessitate developing clear criteria of responsibility, as well as the 
power to commence and conclude. 
The traditional fundamental principles of legitimacy of the 
Westphalia system rest on the notion of state sovereignty, even a 
recommendation that “states that cease to exercise formal control over 
parts of their nominal territories should lose their sovereignty, that is, 
be decertified”.114  This article shares the view that has been expressed 
by some legal scholars that the Westphalian sovereignty model 
“should never have been accorded to fragile post-colonial entities with 
no history and experience of performing as or organizing a state”.115 
The debate as to the best possible means of reconstructing a failed 
state is an ongoing matter, and the proposal that sovereignty may be 
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breached by outsiders in order to build the states can, for some, evoke 
disturbing images of colonialism.  However, as noted above, there is a 
growing body of literature arguing, “international engagement must be 
more robust”.116 Scholars have also suggested that “[w]ithout outside 
intervention, the formation of a state after failure is likely to be in 
vain.”117 
An imposed solution for the reconstruction and rebuilding of 
South Sudan is not the preferred option.  There is need for an engaged 
indigenous process in order for reconstruction to be successful, and to 
be maintained once foreign assistance is withdrawn.  Some scholars 
have indicated that this is not always attainable, but have maintained 
that “[a] certain degree of international control and imposition is 
necessary in order to bring about a well-functioning state, in which the 
ruling elite are accountable to the people.”118  In the context of failed 
states, the need to reintroduce a formal trusteeship that can ensure both 
accountability to agreements and delivery of vital service begs serious 
debate.119 
Given that there is no consensus to apply an overall supervisory 
role similar to the mechanism in place during the Trusteeship Council, 
a number of observers have noted that in lieu of a formal Trusteeship, 
the international community has instead used ad hoc devices for the 
international stewardship of peoples and territory, in what Ralph Wilde 
has termed “international territorial administration.”120  These ad hoc 
arrangements have the same basic objectives as were in place during 
the Trusteeship Council, which were meant to impose order and help 
territories in reconstruction.  For example, in 1999 the United Nations 
Security Council, in adopting resolutions 1272 (East Timor) and 1244 
(Kosovo), and placing these territories under a temporary UN 
administration, in essence reaffirmed the need to revive the 
Trusteeship Council.  In the case of East Timor, “the Competencies of 
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the United Nations Transitional Administration included all the classic 
powers of a state.”121 
These unique circumstances present an opportunity, but also raise 
questions in international law as to the optimal arrangements to deal 
with the sovereignty deficit of these naissance states.  In a recent op-
ed on African Arguments, former Assistant Secretary of the United 
States for Africa, Herman Cohen, noted the Security Council needs to 
establish a trustee mandate, given that “the ruling Sudan People 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) has no ability to govern the country 
particularly given the lack of infrastructure, education, private 
investment and institutions.”122 
In many parts of the world state failure is rooted in weak state 
capacity.  The settlement negotiation of Namibia provides a good 
example of a United Nations trusteeship that occurred in a period of 
transition and led to its independence after several legal classifications 
and compromises that were sui generis of the United Nations 
operation. 
The United Nations had a supervisory central objective, which 
was to hold free and fair elections for a Constituent Assembly that 
would draft a constitution leading to the independence of Namibia.123 
Some scholars have commented that the United Nations Trusteeship 
System “is to some extent a victim of its own success.”124 
Other notable scholars, such as Helman and Ratner, have argued 
for a return of the trusteeship model as a solution to failing states and 
recommend: 
[D]irect U.N. trusteeship when there is a total breakdown 
of governmental authority. . .the theoretical basis for 
conservatorship in the domestic analogue of the polity 
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helping those who are utterly incapable of functioning on 
their own, thereby necessitating a legal regime where the 
community itself manages the affairs of the victim.125 
Helman and Ratner recommend conservatorship as the theoretical 
paradigm for assistance of the United Nations in dealing with failed 
states.126  Helman and Ratner, as well as Richard Caplan, argued that it 
might be necessary to establish a trusteeship under the United Nations 
in extreme cases of state failure.127  These scholars would propose that 
the states in question “voluntarily relinquish control.”128  This is a 
difficult but not impossible task if there is political will on all sides.  
Stephen Krasner notes that to improve the well-being of the domestic 
population, and decrease the threat to the international community, 
alternative options such as de facto trusteeships should be 
considered.129  Krasner advances the notion of shared sovereignty 
involving the participation of external actors to assist with failed state 
reconstruction and a view shared by this article.130  In South Sudan, the 




Since succession, the people of South Sudan have been waiting 
for an elusive peace that simply has not emerged.  Various border wars 
with Sudan, internal conflicts, and human rights abuses against the 
civilian population (in particular gender-based violence) has 
dampened the enthusiasm that was present during the referendum.  The 
secession from Sudan was a long a painful struggle, and somewhat 
unfairly, South Sudan given recognition as a member of the 
international community under the most difficult of circumstances, 
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with few resources and a seemingly impossible mission of rebuilding 
from almost nothing. 
It is for these reasons that some form of de facto trusteeship or 
shared sovereignty is needed.  Although not a panacea to resolve every 
issue evident in the reconstruction of South Sudan, this should have 
been implemented by the international community as a means to assist 
them in building a truly functional state.  Unfortunately, the debate 
surrounding the legal, moral, and practical implications of such large 
state-building mechanisms did not take place. 
Trusteeship reflects both the severity of the predicament and the 
challenge confronting policymakers and scholars regarding the newest 
troubled state.  It may be for these reasons that scholars today are 
looking at trusteeship as a possibly more comprehensive and durable 
solution for South Sudan. 
Non-governmental organizations and informal groups cannot 
replace South Sudan’s lack of a strong federal government and viable 
federal structure.  Given that the present government of South Sudan 
cannot hold the new country together, international intervention of 
some sort is imperative.  The future could be catastrophic for the 
millions of South Sudanese on the brink of famine.  This, coupled with 
inter-ethnic violence and a low intensity conflict with Sudan, could 
quickly threaten South Sudan’s experiment in nationhood. 
 State failure presents a multitude of challenges for the 
international community, and is linked not only to civil wars and other 
serious conflicts, but also to poverty, famine, and other social disasters. 
Given the complex nature of South Sudan and the resultant 
instabilities, it may arguably be in its people’s best interest for the 
international community to retain a high degree of shared sovereignty, 
in order to address the many issues affecting the state’s structural 
competency deficit. 
 Much has changed since the days of the Westphalian concept of 
statehood.  With the emergence of regional and international law—
especially human rights law—the notion of state sovereignty has been 
challenged.  States have a responsibility to protect their citizens and 
ensure that human rights law is followed. Various international law 
treaties undoubtedly chart the important responsibilities that states 
have in respecting international law conventions and in providing 
security for their constituents. 
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States are not by nature failures, or even doomed to fail.  It is 
important to recognize that state formation requires a belief in the state.  
The situation in South Sudan did not happen by chance, as historical 
and geographical circumstances are contributing factors; but it is 
largely the result of autocratic leaders, who contribute to and aggravate 
state failure.  Even as talks between the rebels and the South Sudan 
government take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early 2014, rival 
parties struggle for power with little interest in finding a solution to the 
violence and human misery that has afflicted their people. 
Prevention and reconstruction of South Sudan are two of the most 
important challenges facing the international system, which 
undoubtedly require substantial political will and resources in order to 
establish the structural competencies of the newest UN Member State.  
A United Nations authorized shared sovereignty agreement (possibly 
entailing a trusteeship), under a new international law architecture is 
needed in order to build the rule of law; economic and social 
reconstruction; involvement of civil society, especially by bringing 
women and minority groups into the process; establish security; and 
disarm this post-conflict state.  A trusteeship for South Sudan will 
require political will and resources from the international community.  
However, this may be the only viable solution to the challenges facing 
this troubled nation and region. 
 
